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Paradoxically,  knowledge  of  the  increasing  certainty  about  climate  change,  and  of  the  severe 
consequences of this phenomenon for large portions of the world population, may lead individuals and 
communities  to  fall  into  a  paralysing  defeatism.  Such  defeatism,  even  more  paradoxically,  may  be 
accompanied  by  complacency,  due  to  assumption  that,  on  the  basis  of  our  societies’  institutional, 
scientific and technical capabilities, we can wait until problems really become evident. Both the defeatist 
and the complacent attitude may lead to failure in the application of entirely feasible mitigation and 
adaptation measures, with consequent much increased probabilities of economic, human and ecological 
costs. In view of the degree to which these attitudes are present in our societies we may wonder whether 
inaction may be justifiable on our part despite awareness of stringent responsibilities. Here I argue that, 
even if it may appear that, under these conditions, we cannot take direct action on our responsibilities 
regarding climate change, we still have responsibilities to act at another level.  
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1. Introduction 
In the light of the very limited progress and achievements at the latest rounds of the UNFCC in 
Durban  (2011),  Cancún  (2010)  and  Copenhagen  (2009)  there  remains  little  optimism  about  the 
prospects of our societies in changing course regarding the causes and remedies concerning climate 
change. Neither thoroughgoing mitigation nor new, substantial, adaptation measures seem to be in the 
offing. Increasingly the “rational pessimists,” who see global society surpassing the 2ºC above pre-
industrial levels by 2100, are seen to be winning the day. 
Paradoxically, knowledge of the increasing certainty of human-induced climate change, and of the 
severe  harm  that  it  may  bring  to  large  portions  of  the  world  population,  seems  to  be  leading 
individuals and communities into a paralysing defeatism. Such defeatism, furthermore, increasingly is 
accompanied by complacency, due to the assumption that, given our societies‟ institutional, scientific 
and technical capabilities, we can simply wait to address the problems posed by climate change until 
they actually become troublesome in our proximate, local, environment. As a result, even individuals, 
who  are  aware  of  their  responsibilities  toward  future  generations,  may  feel  that  apathy  may  be 
justified since, if not enough individuals and states pull their weight, it would seem useless, and even 
wasteful, for any one of us to sacrifice our comfort for the sake of an impossible project. 
This is the quandary that I intend to begin to address in this paper. Here, I begin by explaining a little 
further the grounds for taking responsibility concerning climate change. After this, I point out that 
defeatist and complacent attitudes may interfere with acting on our responsibilities, thereby possibly 
leading to failure in the application of entirely feasible mitigation and adaptation measures. Next, I 
note that the result may be significantly greater economic costs and human and ecological harms than 
would  otherwise  be  incurred.  I  close  by  pointing  toward  some  of  the  ways  to  address  these 
problematic attitudes, and propose that individuals who are aware of this situation should perceive it 
as a call to help transform the socio-cultural conditions that generate them. 
 
2. Prudence and ethics 
A diversity of measures, undertaken by various levels of governments, coordinated nationally and 
internationally, are doubtlessly necessary in order to create the institutional framework and material 
infrastructures,  and  to  set  the  overall  course  for  society,  to  address  climate  change  satisfactorily 
through reduction of greenhouse gas emissions, as well as other mitigating strategies, and through 
adaptation to already inevitable effects (Nihlén Fahlquist, 2009).
 2 Though responsibility for action on 
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climate change generally has been discussed in relation to the duties of particular nation-states or 
blocks of nations (the West or Global North vs. the „developing‟ nations of the Global South and the 
„emerging‟ BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India and China) countries), there are good reasons to also consider 
the responsibilities for action of individual citizens, because of their important role in bringing about 
change in society (see, e.g., Moser, 2007). Active involvement by concerned citizens likely is crucial 
in several respects: as sources of new civil society initiatives, as pressure on governmental institutions 
to  carry  through  on  measures  proposed,  and  as  proof  of  the  realisability  of  the  collective 
transformation of current patterns of production and consumption. 
The Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental  Panel on Climate Change (IPCC, 2007) 
strongly supports the view that climate change processes are accelerating, and that future as well as 
present generations are going to experience very significant increases in severity of disastrous, and 
possibly catastrophic, phenomena associated with rapid environmental change, which will bring about 
significant economic costs and harm to human and non-human beings. Alarmingly, measured trends 
in the rise in global average temperatures and sea levels are seen to be even exceeding the worst-case 
scenarios of this latest IPCC Report. 
One analysis of current trends, published in PNAS, states that recent (2000-2006) trends in the growth 
in greenhouse gas emissions due to increased economic activity, greater carbon intensity, and lowered 
efficiency  of  natural  sinks  „characterize  a  carbon  cycle  that  is  generating  stronger-than-expected 
climate forcing sooner than expected‟ (Canadell et al., 2007, p18869, also see Chen et al. 2011 on 
faster than expected range shifts of species due to climate change). Based on such observations, Will 
Steffen concludes in a 2009 report for the Australian Government that „risks associated with the upper 
range of the IPCC projections of climate change for this century need to be considered seriously‟ 
(Steffen, 2009, p4). 
So, given that in the middle to long run everyone, and his or her descendants, can be expected to be at 
risk from at least some of the harmful effects of climate change, a strong case can already be made for 
taking personal responsibility for reasons of prudence. This by itself means that, reasonably, those 
individuals who are capable of acting should actively support measures directed at mitigation and 
adaptation, to be implemented both locally and globally across societies and geographical boundaries, 
and possibly should go even further and develop initiatives to mobilise society about the impending 
peril (see Garvey, 2008). 
There also are very good reasons for supposing that addressing climate change should be considered a 
matter  of  ethical  responsibility.  These  reasons  are  diverse,  and  have  been  discussed  in  detail 
elsewhere (see Gardiner, 2004; Garvey, 2008). They range from taking responsibility for the harmful 
effects that one causes, to fairness in distribution of burdens; and from assuming responsibility on the 4 
 
basis of a commitment to a general harm prevention principle, to the humanitarian requirements of 
solidarity with the more vulnerable. I explain these reasons a bit further here.  
Of particular relevance in this discussion is the fact that the industrialised countries have produced 
most of the anthropogenic greenhouse gases now in circulation, and continue to do so at accelerating 
rates. This means that they bear a special responsibility from the point of view of justice for the harm 
that  these  greenhouse  gas  accumulations  in  the  atmosphere  produce  (this  may  be  seen  as  an 
application of the „polluter pays‟ principle). Moreover, insofar as responsibility can be shared across 
all those who in some way benefit from, or uphold, a system that causes harm, not just governments 
but anyone who lives in the Global North, and is a beneficiary of the industrial development brought 
about by historical greenhouse gas emissions, bears a responsibility for the harmful effects of climate 
change (Young, 2006), and ought to actively support mitigation and adaptation strategies. 
One may also consider common principles of fairness, which, when applied to the capacity to act on 
urgent matters of common concern, translate into the principle that those who are more capable of 
acting should do more (Garvey, 2008). With regard to climate change, this approach means that those 
who  are  better  off  should  assume  greater  responsibility  to  reduce  fossil  fuel  consumption  and 
contribute more, proportionally, to mitigation and adaptation strategies than those who have fewer 
means. 
Notably,  insofar  as  the  financial,  technological  and  organisational  capital  accumulated  by 
industrialised nations largely has been built from, or with the help of, the resources of the rest of the 
world, and since a small fraction of this capital would likely be sufficient to soften the impact of 
climate change for poorer populations, there is, moreover, reason for supposing that, in fairness, the 
richer countries, and especially the richer individuals who live there, have an important responsibility 
to  assist  the  poorer  in  the  implementation  of  adaptation  strategies.  Importantly,  some  adaptation 
strategies also may make the poorer more vulnerable if not carried out in full consultation with, or 
under the direction of, those most in need. (See Heyd and Mustelin, in preparation.) 
Another approach to the question of ethical responsibility draws on the supposition that those who can 
prevent harm from occurring ought to do so, out of consideration for the ultimately common condition 
of vulnerability that we share as human beings (this may be expressed more fully as a general harm 
prevention principle, cp. Singer, 1979, or as a principle of respect for persons, see Kant, 1785/2002, or 
as a principle of solidarity). Everyday examples include acts, such as saving a child from being 
accidentally run over by a speeding car, or rescuing a person from drowning in a nearby pool, but also 
helping people from dying due to malnutrition, when doing so does not require sacrificing anything of 
comparable moral value. This means that those of us who are relatively well-off ought to actively 
address the new risks to present and future human (and possibly to non-human) beings brought on by 
climate change. 5 
 
Some may object, however, that, even granting any of the ethical principles suggested (which, to 
serve  as  guides  in  practical  life  commitment),  citizens  should  rather  focus  on  other  issues  that 
supposedly are more urgent than climate change. One may ask, for example, why we should invest in 
mitigation and adaptation while nearly a billion people around the world are malnourished.
3 Similarly, 
one may ask why finding safe storage for  rapidly growing quantities of  health-threatening nuclear 
wastes, which can be radioactive for more than a million years, should not take precedence. Or, why 
the question of nuclear weapons proliferation should not come first. Or, why the achievement of peace 
among  nuclear  armed  countries  in  volatile  areas,  in  the  Middle  East ,  the  border  regions  of 
Afghanistan-Pakistan, Pakistan-India,  or  India-China,  should not  take  priority  (see Homer-Dixon, 
2006, for discussion of a „watchlist‟ of global stresses). 
The key argument in response to such objections is that climate change likely will make most other 
urgent problems even more urgent. As is well-known, a large portion of the world population is 
vulnerable to food scarcity, droughts, flooding and other effects associated with climate change, and 
has very limited resilience with which to recover after disastrous incidents. Historically, it is well 
known, moreover, that environmental factors (be they cold spells or droughts) are often exploited in 
conflictual situations (see, e.g., Fagan, 2000). 
Consequently, food insecurity, safe storage of nuclear wastes in a politically fragile world, the threat 
of  the  use  of  nuclear  weapons,  the  potential  for  armed  conflicts,  and  so  on,  are  all  issues  that 
potentially can become much more problematic in conjunction with climate change. Any further delay 
in  committing  to  thorough-going  mitigation  and  adaptation  will  foreseeably  make  many  other 
upcoming problems so much harder to cope with, thereby making climate change an issue that is at 
least as urgent as any other. So, in response to the objection that other matters are more urgent, one 
may say that, due to the „multiplier effects‟ that it entails, climate change constitutes an especially 
important issue to immediately address.  
Another objection may be that the call to action on climate change may seem unrealistic, given the 
priorities of today‟s world (such as responding to the possibility of another global recession, with all 
that this entails). There are, moreover, various types of obstacles for people to make their action 
effective in terms of carbon reductions that individuals face at the psychological level (see American 
Psychology Association, 2009; Gifford, 2008), the informational level (insofar as people often do not 
know what to do, see Wolf, 2010), and at the societal-systemic level (insofar as action by individuals 
is limited by the range of choices available as determined by society at large). 
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In response one may note that, though, depending on individual circumstances, it may be difficult to 
quickly transform agriculture, industry or transportation on a societal or planetary scale, there may be 
a few things that most people can undertake to get the transformation of our societies started. For 
example, those who are fairly well-off can take steps to eat, heat, transport, work and build with 
renewable types of energy, and to re-use, recycle, return and compost used materials. For all of these 
activities there are enough technical solutions and resources available in most places, at least in the 
industrialised Global North, to get started immediately.  
These steps require matching supportive policies from governments, of course. Those with influence 
in politics, business or the media should be expected to take steps to remind our leaders of their 
responsibility to change the structural barriers for action, by lobbying governments and uniting in civil 
society pressure groups. As a matter of fact, there are a variety of real life examples, such as the 
Transition Town movement, that demonstrate that transformation of the building blocks of society is 
possible. So, there is little excuse for inaction (even if any adjustment of behaviours requires effort, 
see Garvey, 2008).  
Certainly  more  detailed  arguments  concerning  the  diverse  types  of  responsibility  (prudential  and 
ethical) can be worked out on the basis of rational choice theory and from the perspective of diverse 
particular approaches to ethics, such as utilitarianism, Kant‟s ethics, Rawls‟ theory of justice (see 
Vanderheiden, 2008) or Habermas‟ discourse ethics (Habermas, 1991). Similarly, the distribution and 
source  of  responsibilities,  or  the  assignment  of  benefits  and  costs,  may  be  worth  considering  in 
significantly  greater  detail  (e.g.,  see  Attfield,  2008,  Gardiner,  2004,  Garvey,  2008).  Here  I  will, 
however, forego further discussion of these matters and assume that it is sufficiently evident that there 
are good reasons to conclude that climate change constitutes an urgent prudential and ethical issue, 
such that the need for action, in terms of mitigation and adaptation, is sufficiently well established for 
well-informed ethical reasoners. 
 
3. ‘All or nothing’ and ‘wait and see’ 
As noted, climate change has to be addressed through strong policies, laws and incentives issuing 
from governments and inter-governmental institutions (Nihlén Fahlquist, 2009), but probably little 
action  can  be  expected  from  such  institutions  without  active  participation  by  citizens  who  take 
personal responsibility for the state of our world. This means, among other things, that it is important 
to understand how information on climate change is disseminated by natural and social scientists, how 
it is moulded by the media and appropriated by opinion-makers of various political stripes, and what 
citizens come to understand as a result of this process (Moser and Dilling, 2007). 7 
 
Certainly there is no single way in which people apprehend climate news (Hulme, 2009; Moser and 
Dilling, 2007) but, strikingly, despite widespread awareness of climate change, this knowledge still 
has not led citizens to exert sufficient pressure on decision-makers to adopt appropriate policies (as 
we can see from the mostly disappointing 2009 COP15 and 2010 COP16 meetings, in Copenhagen 
and Cancún, respectively). One of the most troublesome kinds of reaction to increasingly sobering 
news about accelerating climate change is a kind of ‘all or nothing’ attitude, which proclaims that, 
since we cannot any longer prevent global warming wholesale, it may be ignored.
4 This attitude can 
constitute a powerful impediment to the implementation of mitigation policies , which, as any other 
insurance scheme, entails costs up front. 
The „all or nothing‟ attitude seems based on a combination of factual misapprehensions regarding the 
actual  risks  associated  with  further  increases  in  greenhouse  gases  in  the  atmosphere  (and  in  the 
oceans, generating increasing levels of acidification), inappropriate priorities, as well as minimalist 
habits  that  recommend  inaction  despite  considerable  urgency.  Notably,  while  we  are  already 
committed to important climate effects (for example, considerable thawing of on-land glaciers, and 
increases in droughts and in storm intensities), continued emissions at present rates, however, mean 
still greater potential commitments, such as the thawing of the Greenland and Antarctica icecaps, with 
further intensification of linear, as well as hard to fully comprehend non-linear, effects that may be 
leading to surpassing important tipping points. Therefore, defeatism or „fatalism‟ in view of climate 
change may lead to much worse consequences than already are to be expected. 
The complementary attitude to the „all or nothing‟ attitude is to „wait and see‟ in the expectation that 
the combined power of science, engineering and financial institutions will be sufficient to cope with 
national  or  local  disturbances,  if  and  when  they  occur.
5  A complacent  „wait  and  see‟  attitude, 
however, fails to take into account key aspects concerning capacity to act (also see O‟Brien et al., 
2006). The climate science consensus clearly shows that, without adequate mitigation and adaptation 
strategies to limit the extent of climate change and to lower vulnerability and increase resilience, 
simple coping cannot and should not be relied upon as a satisfactory response to the severe physical, 
                                                       
4 This attitude may even be found among otherwise apparently well-informed people. See Baron (2006, p146), 
who speaks of „a futile war against global warming‟, and suggests that it may be more „cost-effective‟ to devote 
financial resources to the promotion of the development of poor countries to prepare them for the now inevitable 
consequences of climate change. There are reasons to be skeptical, in any case, about the value for the poor of 
many development and adaptation strategies, which primarily benefit already well-to-do minorities. See, for 
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social  and  political  consequences  of  climate  change  (IPCC,  2007;  also  see  Adger  et  al.,  2009; 
Schipper and Burton, 2009).  
The „wait and see‟ attitude overlooks that even where societies have considerable scientific capacities, 
technical know-how and financial power, effective coping with severe environmental events generally 
requires  previous  application  of  these  resources  through  antecedent  adaptation  strategies.  It  also 
overlooks that mitigation may constitute the best kind of adaptation, since mitigation should lead to a 
significant reduction of the eventual human harm, as well as decrease the financial costs of adaptation, 
and of the subsequent costs of coping when actual disturbances occur. 
A „wait and see‟ attitude, furthermore, ignores that there are very large populations both in the less 
industrialised parts of the world that lack most of the means to cope with the consequences of climate 
change, such as increased floods, droughts, and the expected resulting food shortages, greater spread 
of diseases, and so on. There are, moreover, considerable populations in the industrialised countries, 
such as poorer urbanites that are homeless or in temporary housing, who are vulnerable to phenomena 
such as heat waves, severe winter cold, or flooding. (There are multiple cases of significant hardship 
and even mortality caused by such phenomena in Europe and North America, for example, the 2003 
European  heat  wave,  the  extraordinarily  cold  European  winter  of  2009-2010,  the  2005  Katrina 
hurricane and the flooding of New Orleans, and the flooding of Genoa, Italy this year 2011. Hence, it 
is reasonable to suppose that, if those who are better-off and have the capability to act forgo vigorous 
mitigation and adaptation then the more vulnerable will increasingly will be in harms‟ way.  
Both  the  defeatist  „all  or  nothing‟  and  the  complacent  „wait  and  see‟  attitudes  may  lead  to 
unnecessary,  supplementary,  difficulties,  and  bring  about  important  additional  costs,  because  the 
problems posed by climate change are taken on too late in the game (see Stern, 2007). These attitudes 
may, in fact, play into the hands of those who would rather opt for „solving‟ climate change through 
costly new geo-engineering mega-projects – even if the solutions proposed are untested and may 
subject world populations to incalculable new risks (Gardiner, 2010).  
Hence, allowing  for  the  development  of  policy  under the  sway  of  either defeatist  or  complacent 
attitudes  may  lead  to  projects  that  contravene  the  precautionary  principle  (widely  endorsed  by 
international  law),  which  demands  that  populations  not  be  subjected  to  actions  that  represent 
additional  levels  of  risk  (see  Gardiner,  2006,  also  see  the  1998  Wingspread  Statement  on  the 
Precautionary Principle). To this we may add that it is to be expected that species extinction rates will 
accelerate as climate change proceeds, and that coping activities, even if they involve grand schemes 




4. Summation and conclusion 
Both the defeatism of the „all or nothing‟ attitude, of doing nothing because action supposedly is 
futile, and the complacency of the „wait and see‟ attitude, of inaction until coping is inevitable, mean 
that human and other living beings will be exposed to increasing, very serious, harm, a large part of 
which is still preventable. Since addressing climate change will require everybody‟s participation 
(see,  e.g.,  Weber,  2006),  these  attitudes  in  society  should  lead  to  two  questions:  how  can  these 
attitudes be effectively addressed?, and, for individuals who are aware of this situation, what are their 
responsibilities under these circumstances? Though there is no space here to speak to these questions 
in depth, with regard to the first question we may note recent research that suggests that such attitudes 
are the product of a combination of individual, social and material factors, which may be viewed as 
„barriers‟ or as „obstacles‟ to action (see Adger et al., 2009; American Psychology Association, 2009; 
Gifford, 2008; Leiserowitz, 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 2007). 
 
Notably, defeatist and complacent attitudes may be the result of misapprehensions regarding the facts, 
troublesome ways of prioritizing aims and objectives, or the behaviour-shaping power of problematic 
habits,  all  of  which  together  may  be  the  consequences  of  the  dominance  of  certain  unreflected 
lifestyle choices and common socio-cultural expectations (see, e.g., Lorenzoni et al., 2007). As such, 
addressing these attitudes calls for measures such as better modes of communication, greater scientific 
literacy, and more open debate on policy options. 
 
More specifically, the defeatist and complacent attitudes may perhaps be defused by drawing attention 
to concrete events with local effects, which, as such, are, or may become, available for everyday 
experience. One way to counter the „all or nothing‟ attitude, for example, may be by clearly showing 
that significant additional, local, adaptation costs will have to be incurred by various proximate levels 
of government if mitigation is not taken on, and that, if adaptation is postponed, coping with severe 
events will be even more costly. Moreover, to address the „wait and see‟ attitude it may be useful, for 
example, to help people recognise that climate change processes are already taking place, and nearby, 
through guided tours to nature reserves, where the vertical or latitudinal displacement of species may 
be observable, or to weather observatories where records of local weather trends are displayed. 
 
Another way to counter these attitudes may consist in creating opportunities for reflection on the fact 
that vulnerable sectors of our societies, locally and globally, will be directly hurt by climate change. 
Such facts collide with common humanitarian values that require solidarity with members of the 
larger community who are at risk and that proactive or remedial actions be taken (see, e.g., Heyd, 
2007, ch. 2). Such processes of reflection may help people realise that climate change is an issue of 
prudential and ethical concern. 10 
 
 
With  regard  to  the  second  question,  concerning  one‟s  personal  responsibilities  under  these 
circumstances, we may note that such responsibilities do not, in any case, disappear in the presence of 
general inaction. Inaction by society should rather be grounds for renewed creative engagement in 
strategies that will get other citizens involved. As I have argued elsewhere (Heyd, 2011), insofar as 
inaction  is  the  result  of  inadequacies  in  our  cultural  frameworks,  addressing  it  may  require  a 
fundamental reassessment of these background conditions, which include the basic beliefs, values, 
habits, practices and lifestyle choices that control our everyday. Consequently, responsibility to act on 
climate change translates to responsibility to help transform the cultural frameworks that underlie our 
capacities (or lack of capacities) to take action (see Heyd, 2011). This applies to individuals who 
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